THE LISBON TREATY AND THE AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE AS AN AREA OF LEGAL INTEGRATION by Stephen David Coutts
87CYELP 7 [2011] 87-107
THE LISBON TREATY AND THE AREA OF FREEDOM, 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE AS AN AREA OF LEGAL 
INTEGRATION
Stephen David Coutts*
Summary: This paper considers the Area of Freedom, Security and Ju-
stice (AFSJ) in the broader context of European integration and links 
it to two trends in the development of the European Union: firstly, the 
expanding scope of European law and secondly the increasingly fra-
gmented nature of the integration process. The paper provides a histo-
ric and thematic description of the AFSJ and argues that it represents, 
amongst other things, a movement of the EU into areas of ‘high poli-
tics’ and the development of a nascent ‘European public order’, linking 
territory, the state and citizens. In a parallel development, European 
integration has developed into a system of organising difference and 
accommodating national preferences. This is epitomised in the AFSJ 
where the system of integration, analysed under various parameters, 
appears to emphasise national autonomy and to facilitate variation.
Introduction
European law can be described as a law of integration.1 The achie-
vement of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) is one of the 
objectives of the European Union.2 Can the AFSJ be conceived as an area 
of legal integration? Given the significant changes that took place in the 
AFSJ in the Treaty of Lisbon and the publication of the latest multi-annu-
al policy programme,3 it would be timely to take stock of the AFSJ and to 
place it in the broader context of European legal integration.
In its half century of existence, both the object of European integrati-
on and the form of that integration have changed significantly. While ori-
ginally concerned with the construction of a common market, economic 
integration and related ‘flanking measures’, in recent decades the range 
of matters covered by the law of the European Union has expanded to 
include more overtly political areas such as internal security, immigra-
*  PhD researcher, Department of Law, European University Institute, Florence.
1 P Pescatore, Le Droit de l’intégration (reprint, Bruylant 2005), remains a classic in this 
regard.
2 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C-83/1 article 3 (2) Treaty on European Union 
(hereinafter TEU).
3 In particular, the latest multi-annual programme for the development of the AFSJ, the 
Stockholm Programme, Council Document 17024/09 adopted by the European Council on 
10/11 December 2009. 
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tion and asylum, police and judicial cooperation, citizenship and funda-
mental rights. In this context, the construction of the AFSJ marks a new 
stage in the development of the European Union.
However parallel to the expansion of the subject matter of European 
integration, the form of integration has also substantially changed, so 
much so that some are of the opinion that the law of the EU has come full 
circle and these voices have called for a theory of ‘disintegration’.4 From a 
period when legal integration focused primarily on the creation of norms 
developed centrally and applied uniformly, in recent decades EU law has 
known increased fragmentation.5 As evidence of this trend, authors have 
cited on the one hand the non-uniform participation by Member States 
in certain EU policies, and on the other hand certain characteristics of 
EU legal instruments that emphasise increased divergence in its appli-
cation.6
The AFSJ can be seen as continuing these trends in the process of 
European integration: the expanding reach of integration and its increa-
singly differentiated form. The creation of the AFSJ and its institutional 
maturity in light of the Treaty of Lisbon in the European Union represents 
a significant expansion in the subject matter of European integration and 
the construction of a European polity. In particular, it marks a move from 
the creation of a European economic space to a ‘European public order’, 
a trend complemented by the increasing importance of citizenship and 
fundamental rights in the Union. On the other hand, the type of integra-
tion, with a notable emphasis on a multi-speed integration process and 
differentiated integration, is consistent with the broader trend towards 
an emphasis on horizontal forms of integration. 
This paper will place the AFSJ, in the light of the Treaty of Lisbon, in 
the broader context of European integration. After a brief overview of the 
changing nature of integration in the EU it will provide a short historical 
introduction to the AFSJ and will assess what is being integrated in the 
AFSJ. The final section will assess the form of integration taking place 
in the AFSJ in the light of the Treaty of Lisbon. Integration in the AFSJ 
follows the trend of recent developments of integration in the EU and 
is marked by increased differentiation with an emphasis on horizontal 
methods and fragmented norms. Integration in the AFSJ is designed to 
manage rather than eliminate legal differences. Where appropriate, refe-
4 See J Shaw, ‘European Union Legal Studies in Crisis? Towards a New Dynamic’ (1996) 
16(2) OJLS 231-253.
5 See generally G de Burca & J Scott, Constitutional Change in the EU: From Uniformity 
to Flexibility? (Hart Publishing 2000). 
6 Such as the use of options in Directives, derogations, and increasing reference to nati-
onal law terms. See S Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (Clarendon 
Press 1995) ch 5.
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rence will be made to policy and legislative developments since the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
I. The changing nature of legal integration in the EU
Conceived of as an agent of integration, one of the original (and per-
haps principal) purposes of law in the context of the EU was to ensure 
that variations between differing legal systems did not hinder cross-bor-
der activities and cooperation. In order to achieve this goal, integrati-
on entailed the gradual removal of differentiated treatment as part of a 
‘process leading… to an increase in the exchanges between the various 
societies concerned and to a more centralized form of government’.7 Very 
often, such legal integration was to take the form of ‘a replacement or 
an overlay of national norms by European ones’.8 This traditional vision 
of legal integration, dominant in the 1980s, fitted with the vision of EU 
integration as the construction of a relatively classic hierarchical federal 
legal system. Indeed, there was an explicit federalist theme to the famo-
us ‘Integration through Law’ project, conducted in the EUI, Florence, in 
the 1980s.9 Later, Dehousse and Weiler outlined various ‘parameters of 
integration’ according to which a legal system can be assessed as repre-
senting lesser or greater integration. Amongst the factors to be conside-
red in assessing the system of integration is the binding nature of the 
‘central law’, the decision-making process, the role of the ‘centralised 
institutions, the existence of a ‘hierarchy of norms’ and of a centralised 
adjudicative body.10
However, since the early 1990s the picture of the EU legal order 
as a formally structured, hierarchical system has been replaced with a 
more nuanced vision of the EU, accepting a plurality of autonomous legal 
orders conceived of in more or less heterarchical structures. And while 
much academic focus has been on the more general questions of so-
vereignty and constitutional pluralism,11 it is submitted that there is a 
related trend in the role and techniques of legal integration. The vision 
of integration as the progressive establishment of a set of uniform rules 
superimposed on and/or replacing the relevant national rules through a 
system of centralised rule-making bodies has become outdated. Since the 
mid 1990s, greater emphasis has been placed on ‘differentiated’ or ‘flexi-
ble integration’ through the increased use of minimum harmonisation 
7 RD Dehousse & JHH Weiler, ‘The Legal Dimension’ in WW Wallace (ed), The Dynamics 
of European Integration (Pinter 1990) 246. 
8 ibid.
9 M Cappelletti, M Secombe & JHH Weiler (eds), Integration Through Law (de Gruyter 
1985).
10 Dehousse & Weiler (n 7). 
11 M Abeij, ‘Questioning EU Constitutionalisms’ (2008) 9(1) German Law Journal 1. 
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and enhanced cooperation.12 The focus of EU legal action appears to have 
changed from eliminating difference to ‘organising difference’.13
The shift in the role of EU law towards organising rather than eli-
minating differences between the legal systems of Member States can 
perhaps be related to the changing scope of EU law. The construction of a 
common market necessarily involved the creation of a ‘level playing field’, 
and to some extent homogenous economic conditions were a necessary 
consequence of the creation of the internal market. Additionally, matters 
of economic regulation, being for the most part technical, presented va-
riation in terms of national preferences that could be managed by tech-
nical regulation.14 Obstacles to uniform harmonisation based on diverse 
political values or choices, while certainly not absent, were less frequent 
compared to other areas of policy. However, as the role of the EU became 
increasingly diversified, EU regulation saw an increasing tendency to em-
ploy legislative techniques that allowed for the accommodation of varying 
national preferences. An example was the use of minimum harmonisa-
tion in the internal market as a means to manage variations in national 
preferences in environmental, social and employment policies.15 
As the latest, and perhaps most ‘political’, stage in the development 
of the EU, the system of integration in AFSJ continues and institutiona-
lises this trend of facilitating variation. Given the relationship between 
the AFSJ and certain core state functions and sovereignty, it is to be 
expected that the system of integration implemented in the AFSJ would 
take particular care to respect the role and autonomy of national legal 
orders.16 As the role of the EU expands to more overtly political areas, the 
system of integration adapts in order to manage, rather than eliminate, 
difference and variation.
The rest of this article will focus on describing the AFSJ and its 
system of integration in the light of the Treaty of Lisbon. It will offer a 
historical account of the development of the AFSJ and will attempt to 
12 See de Burca & Scott (n 5); Shaw (n 4); B de Witte, D Hanf & E Vos (eds), The Many Faces 
of Differentiation in EU Law (Intersentia 2001); F Tuytschaever, Differentiation in European 
Union Law (Hart 1999). 
13 CVD Curtin, ‘Emerging Institutional Parameters and Organised Difference in the EU’ in 
de Witte, Hanf & Vos (n 12). 
14 The notion that micro-economic matters of regulation could be managed by a technocra-
tic supranational institution forms the basis of what Majone has termed the ‘regulatory sta-
te’. See G Majone, ‘The European Community as a Regulatory State’ (1994) 5(1) European 
Community Law, Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 321.
15 M Dougan ‘Minimum Harmonisation and the Internal Market’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 852.
16 This is perhaps related to the increasingly acknowledged multi-level conceptions of the 
EU legal order, particularly in the AFSJ. See L Hooghe & G Marks, Multi-Level Governance 
and European Integration (Rowman & Littlefield 2001); for the related concept of multi-le-
vel constitutionalism, see I Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union’ 
(2002) 27(5) EL Rev 511.
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identify what it signifies in the development of the European Union. It 
will be seen that the AFSJ represents political functions that lie at the 
heart of the modern state (Section II). As a result, the system established 
in the AFSJ under Lisbon is careful to stress the continued importance of 
national legal systems and to accommodate variation and differentiated 
preferences (Section III). 
II. The history of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the 
construction of a European public order
This section places the AFSJ in the context of the first trend in Eu-
ropean integration mentioned in the introduction, that of the expanding 
range of policies subject to integration measures and the activities of the 
European Union. In a sense, this is obvious. The movement of the EU 
into policy areas previously considered the exclusive purview of the na-
tion-state, in particular security issues, is in itself important and forms 
part of the general extension of the European Union’s powers and range 
of activities beyond the traditional economic core of the internal market.17 
In terms of policy areas, most of the AFSJ predated the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon.18 However, the Treaty of Lisbon has seen 
a significant widening of powers within those policy areas.19 This is not 
to say, however, that the treatment of the AFSJ in the Treaty of Lisbon 
and recent policy developments, in particular the Stockholm Programme, 
have had no impact on the wider story of European integration. The cre-
ation and development of the AFSJ marks a significant shift in the focus 
of European integration and in the construction of a European polity. 
The AFSJ is part of a wider story of the European Union, appropriating 
various state-like attributes to itself: the provision of security, the appro-
priation of a territory, the development of various public values and the 
gradual creation of a citizenry.20 This development has been incremental 
and the Treaty of Lisbon is the latest step in this process. 
The first instances of cooperation in the areas that were to become 
the AFSJ took place outside what was then the EEC. The establishment 
of the Trevi working groups in 1975 and the Schengen system were forms 
of inter-governmental cooperation characterised by a highly technical 
subject matter and specialist technical committees. The creation of the 
17 See A von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Supranational Federation: A Conceptual 
Attempt in the Light of the Amsterdam Treaty’ (2000) 6 Columbia Journal of European Law 
27.
18 That is to say that prior to the Treaty of Lisbon the EU had competence of some kind in 
most areas now covered by the AFSJ: immigration, asylum, criminal law, judicial coopera-
tion, etc. 
19 See as an example article 83(2) TFEU on criminal offences. 
20 See von Bogdandy (n 17).
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European Union with the Treaty of Maastricht marked a new stage in the 
development of internal security cooperation in Europe. Occupying the 
third pillar of the three pillar structure of the European Union, Justice 
and Home Affairs cooperation retained much of its inter-governmental 
characteristics with a special decision-making process dominated by na-
tional governments and the requirements of unanimity. It also employed 
weaker legislative instruments compared to the more developed Commu-
nity pillar. Nonetheless, the creation of the third pillar marked a shifting 
dynamic in the governance of security in Europe, turning the EU into 
a site where public interest in matters of justice and home affairs was 
to be represented, and involving the EU in the provision of these public 
goods.21
Concerns regarding both judicial and democratic oversight in the 
context of Justice and Home Affairs and the efficiency of the institutional 
systems in the third pillar led to calls for reform in negotiations leading 
to the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam. At the same time, given the 
sensitivity of the subject matters and the fact that they represented are-
as close to the ‘core’ of state sovereignty, Member States were unwilling 
to abandon entirely the inter-governmental structures in the area. The 
resulting compromise partially communitarised the third pillar, moving 
matters relating to immigration, asylum and visas22 into the new Title IV 
of the EC Treaty, while internal security matters, criminal law and police 
and judicial cooperation remained in the ‘rump’ third pillar.23 The resul-
ting institutional arrangements also reflected a halfway house between 
supranationalism and inter-governmentalism, with the ‘Community’ ele-
ments being marked by certain inter-governmental characteristics and 
some supranational elements being introduced in the third pillar. It is 
worth noting that the Treaty of Amsterdam also saw the incorporation of 
the Schengen system into the European Union structure. The Schengen 
acquis was split between the two elements of the AFSJ depending on 
whether it related to the free movement of persons or broader questions 
of security. In order to provide a link between the two institutional fra-
meworks that now contained the policy of the Union in Justice and Home 
Affairs, the Treaty of Amsterdam saw the creation of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. 
Given the broad subject matter, the use of the term ‘area’ incorpo-
rated the ‘material heterogeneity’ of the AFSJ and was employed by the 
21 AH Gibbs, ‘Reasoned “Balance” in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ 
(2011) 17(1) European Law Journal 121.
22 Broadly, and perhaps somewhat confusingly, entitled ‘policies relating to the free move-
ment of persons’.
23 J Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: Reform at the Price of 
Fragmentation’ (1998) 23(4) EL Rev 320.
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Commission as a means to present a coherent domain of action while 
spreading it across different legal bases in the Treaty of Amsterdam.24 It 
is clear that anyone approaching the topic faces some ‘basic design pro-
blems’ and a not insignificant difficulty in identifying an element of ‘cohe-
rence’ in the AFSJ, ie ‘a defining feature or features of the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice itself’.25 Walker identifies policy coherence as 
one potential type of ‘coherence’ that could be imposed on the AFSJ and 
it is true that the various policies that fall within the ambit of the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice have been the object of increasingly 
systematic treatment over the years. Thus, ‘freedom’, ‘security’ and ‘ju-
stice’ are frequently cross-referenced and framed in terms of each other, 
with policy documents stressing the functional links between the three 
concepts.26 This has led to what Kostakopoulou has termed the ‘discur-
sive chain of freedom, security and justice’.27 The Commission itself has 
recently acknowledged that the ‘Union must resist tendencies to treat 
security, justice and fundamental rights in isolation from one another’.28 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that deeper and perhaps more signifi-
cant coherence can indeed be identified amongst the three components 
of the AFSJ. Common to all three goods is the relationship between law 
and the individual in a democratic society. In an early effort to explore the 
meaning of the AFSJ, the Commission saw the concept as enshrining at a 
‘European level the essence of what we derive from our democratic tradi-
tions and what we understand by the rule of law’.29 In a different context, 
this has been called a ‘European public order’.30 
24 J Monar, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in A von Bogdandy & J Bast (eds), 
Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart 2010).
25 See N Walker ‘In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional 
Odyssey’ in N Walker (ed), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (OUP 2004) 5.
26 Often with the language and discourse of security providing the main frame of reference. 
Thus, ‘if one looks at the three concepts of freedom, security and justice together, one can 
clearly see that security is the main linking element: it is part of the rationale of the justice 
concept of the AFSJ and at the same time an essential condition of its concept of freedom’ 
(Monar (n 24)).  Indeed, use of the neofunctionalist spill-over theory to explain the security 
element of the AFSJ is well known. See A Niemann & P Schimetter, ‘Neofunctionalism’ in A 
Wiener & T Diez (eds), European Integration Theory (OUP 2009) 57.
27 D Kostakopoulou, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the European Union’s 
Constitutional Dialogue’ in C Barnard (ed), The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited (OUP 
2009) 174.
28 Commission, ‘Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme (Communication) 
COM (2010) 171 final. 
29 Commission, ‘Towards an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (Communication) COM 
(1998) 459 final.
30 C Kaunert, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Construction of a “European 
Public Order”’ (2005) 14(4) European Security 459; H Lindahl, ‘Finding a Place for Freedom, 
Security and Justice: The European Union’s Claim to Territorial Unity’ (2004) 29(4) EL Rev 
461.
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The concept of an AFSJ involves the creation of a single area of 
common values situated at a European level. This concept of a single 
area has a symbolic, political value and resonates strongly with the lan-
guage of integration and indeed moves the process of integration beyond 
the creation of a common market and the related flanking measures. As 
stated by Labayle: 
Ceci va donc bien au delà du simple jeu de la liberté de déplacement 
et de séjour et enclenchera inévitablement un processus de rappro-
chement et d’intégration que les imperfections techniques pourront 
retarder mais pas empêcher.31 
The AFSJ, grouping together concepts of justice, freedom, rights, se-
curity, the rule of law and increasingly democratic values, can be said to 
involve the gradual creation of a nascent, and still somewhat ill-defined, 
‘European public order’. We have already seen how under the Treaty of 
Maastricht the European Union for the first time became a site of public 
interest for internal security. Under Amsterdam, with the partial commu-
nitarisation of some justice and home affairs matters and the creation of 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Union began the process 
of integrating more fully certain ‘high policy’ areas into the heart of the 
European project and thus transforming it.32 The Treaty of Lisbon conti-
nues the construction of an increasingly autonomous ‘European Public 
Order’, in particular through the linking of citizenship, territory and pu-
blic values.
Small but significant changes have been introduced in the designa-
tion of the AFSJ as an objective of the Union and its general place in 
the Treaty architecture. It maintains, and to some extent improves, its 
position amongst the reprioritised objectives, ranking ahead of the inter-
nal market and just below the promotion of peace and the well-being of 
citizens.  As stated by Craig: 
it is not fortuitous that mention of the area of freedom, security and 
justice has ‘moved up’ the list to become Article 3(2) of the TEU, the-
reby signifying its centrality to the EU polity.33 
In addition, AFSJ is now integrated fully into the new unified Treaty 
architecture with the absorption of the third pillar. The important prac-
tical implications of this incorporation for the system of integration will 
be explored in further detail below, but it nonetheless resonates sym-
bolically. The clear designation of the AFSJ as an area of supranational 
31 See H Labayle, ‘Un Espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice’ (1997) 33(4) Revue Trime-
strielle de Droit Europeen 813. 
32 See von Bogdandy (n 17).
33 P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP 2011) 338.
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governance confirms and strengthens the importance of the European 
Union as an autonomous site of public interest in these matters, rather 
than simply a point of inter-governmental interaction. 
The Treaty of Lisbon also strengthens the AFSJ links with two other 
important developments in the European Union, namely the increasingly 
developed system of fundamental rights and of Union citizenship.  Re-
spect for fundamental rights is now explicitly linked with the AFSJ in 
the first article of the new consolidated provisions on the AFSJ, whereby 
‘the Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with 
respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and tradi-
tions of the Member States’. 34
The notion of the AFSJ is being increasingly associated with citi-
zenship of the Union. In article 3 TEU the objective of developing Europe-
an citizenship has been to some extent incorporated into the objective of 
the AFSJ. The development of European citizenship has been dropped as 
an objective. However, the Union now ‘offers its citizens’ an AFSJ rather 
than simply being committed to ‘maintaining and developing’ an area of 
freedom, security and justice, as was the case under the Treaty of Am-
sterdam. 
The increasing association of fundamental rights and citizenship with 
the AFSJ in the Treaty of Lisbon is even more explicit in the more recent 
policy documents of the Commission and the Council. The Stockholm 
Programme adopted by the European Council immediately prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon is the latest in a series of multi-
annual programme documents intended to guide the development of the 
AFSJ. Entitled ‘the Stockholm Programme: An open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting the citizen’, it is intended to move ‘towards a Ci-
tizens’ Europe in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. Equally, 
the priority for Union action over the five-year period is ‘to focus on the 
interests and needs of citizens. The challenge will be to ensure respect 
for fundamental freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing security in 
Europe’. Citizenship and fundamental rights now form integral parts of 
Union action in this field and indeed form the theme of the programme. 
Fundamental rights and citizenship, including more ‘traditional’ citi-
zenship rights previously associated with the internal market such as 
free movement, are now incorporated into the AFSJ (at least from a policy 
perspective).
Besides the importance of citizenship, fundamental rights and the 
development of a community of values, the construction of the AFSJ has 
a clear territorial element. By speaking of a specific area, the Union is 
34 Article 67(1) TFEU. 
96 Stephen David Coutts: The Lisbon Treaty and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice...
appropriating a geographic domain for itself, grouping together the terri-
tories of the different states. The geographic theme arises in numerous 
contexts in the AFSJ. In developing a policy for frontiers, both internal 
and external, the Union is to some extent defining itself in terms of terri-
tory.35 At the time of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Twomey spoke of a ‘secure 
space’.36 This territorial element has been strengthened further in the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Notably, article 67(1) TFEU assimilates the Union itself 
to the AFSJ, stating that now ‘the Union shall constitute an area of free-
dom, security and justice…’.37
The Treaty of Lisbon marks another step in the construction of a 
‘political’ Europe and a European public order. The consolidation and 
incorporation of the AFSJ into the supranational architecture represents 
the recognition of the Union’s role in this area, and the reprioritising of 
the AFSJ as an objective of the Union marks its increasing importance for 
European polity. Finally, the increased ties between the AFSJ and fun-
damental rights and citizenship bring together important developments 
in the European Union and lead to increasing affirmation of the Union 
as a distinct political entity manifesting a territory, a people and specific 
values. The AFSJ in Lisbon continues the trend of extending the scope of 
European integration.
Nonetheless, unlike the internal market or other policy objectives, 
the creation of the AFSJ continues to lack a ‘particular finalité’.38 It is 
difficult, beyond the abstract (if growing) symbolism in the Treaty and po-
licy documents, to identify the core common components of such a ‘Euro-
pean public order’. It is difficult to identify a single guiding policy objec-
tive such as the creation of a common market. In areas where the EU 
acted as a functional union,39 certain tasks such as the suppression of 
protectionism were ‘existential’ to the EU – the system itself was premised 
on particular policy choices.40 This is not the case for the AFSJ. Beyond 
abstract commitments to a high level of protection of fundamental rights, 
free movement and a ‘more secure Europe’, there are no specific policy 
choices that are inherent to the AFSJ. Significant variations still persist 
amongst Member States regarding the means to achieve these rather ab-
35 H Lindahl, ‘Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Union’s 
Claim to Territorial Unity’ (2004) 29(4) EL Rev 461.
36 P Twomey, ‘Constructing a Secure Space: The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ in 
D O’Keefe & P Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart Publishing 1999). 
37 Article 67(1) TFEU.
38 See Walker (n 25).  
39 Von Bogdandy (n 17).
40 Menon and Weatherill make this point in relation to EU trade law when discussing the 
legitimacy in the EU. A Menon & S Weatherill, ‘Democratic Politics in a Globalising World: 
Supra-Nationalism and Legitimacy in the European Union’ (2007) LSE Law Society and 
Economy Working Papers No 13/2007, 8. 
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stract goals. Furthermore, the AFSJ represents an area of ‘high politics’ 
that can be said to affect the core of state sovereignty. The sensitivity 
of the policy area naturally raises questions of adequately accommoda-
ting differences in national preferences. The construction of the AFSJ, 
in contrast to the internal market, involves a form of integration more 
respectful of the autonomy of national legal systems and allowing greater 
space for the accommodation of difference.41 
III. The system of integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice post-Lisbon 
The Lisbon Treaty collapsed the pillar structure and incorporated 
the remaining aspects of the AFSJ into the (former) Community structu-
re. To this extent, the AFSJ now represents a ‘normal’ area of European 
integration and enjoys all the highly developed features of such a system. 
However, in recent decades European integration has become increasin-
gly fragmented and differentiated.42 This is not a new phenomenon, nor 
is it particular to the AFSJ.43 However, the AFSJ continues this trend and 
to some extent epitomises it. The following section assesses the system 
of integration in the AFSJ based on certain parameters of integration 
identified by Dehousse and Weiler.44 While the nature of integration and 
legislative action in the EU has changed somewhat since they were de-
veloped, they are still useful as a means of representing the type of inte-
gration in a particular system. These parameters include the nature of 
competences, the decision-making process, the binding effect of certain 
norms, enforcement, the territorial scope of the integration, and the tech-
niques designed to achieve legal integration.
i. The nature of competences in the AFSJ
The first step in determining the role of the EU in any policy area 
is an assessment of its competences. For the most part, the number of 
policy areas covered by the AFSJ was not substantially increased under 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Nonetheless, the EU was granted significant new 
powers within these areas. 
41 This could equally be described as ‘lesser’ integration compared to the internal market 
and this is to some extent implicit in the analysis. However the focus of this piece is not so 
much to place the AFSJ on a spectrum of integration from ‘integrated’ to ‘not integrated’, 
but rather to assess its form in the light of the Treaty of Lisbon and to suggest why it has 
developed in such a way.
42 See Shaw (n 4) and, for the constitutional implications, N Walker, ‘Flexibility Within 
a Metaconstititional Frame: Reflections on the Future of Legal Authority in Europe’ in de 
Búrca & Scott (n 5).
43 See Weatherill (n 6) ch 4.
44 Dehousse and Weiler (n 7).
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Under the Treaty of Lisbon’s new system of enumerated competen-
ces, the AFSJ falls under the title of shared competences, meaning that 
Member States may act in the area to the extent that the Union has not 
exercised its competences. Thus, a doctrine of pre-emption operates whe-
reby Member States’ competences will be gradually replaced as the Union 
exercises its own competences. In this regard, the system of integration 
would appear to favour the supranational level, emphasising as it does 
the progressively exclusionary nature of EU competences. However, as 
stated by Craig, ‘the nature of the power sharing between the EU and 
the Member States can only be divined by looking at the detailed provisi-
ons of the particular area’.45 Such a detailed examination reveals certain 
characteristics of competences in the AFSJ that would appear to limit 
to some extent action by the Union,46 by implication preserving Member 
State autonomy, thus favouring a more decentralised form of integration.
Firstly, whereas the principle of attributed competences governs the 
allocation of competences to the EU generally,47 in the AFSJ this principle 
is applied particularly rigorously. Not only are the areas of Union action 
specifically defined, but the Treaty also lists the specific measures that 
may be taken within these areas. In the AFSJ, the EU is not granted 
general powers to take measures to achieve a certain defined goal, such 
as the free movement of goods.  Instead, its powers are limited to taking 
specific measures. The manner in which ‘competences’ are allocated in 
the AFSJ thus particularly limits the action of the Union.48
45 Craig (n 33). 
46 This would appear to be consistent with Protocol (No 25) on the Exercise of Shared 
Competences, added to the Treaty of Lisbon in order to emphasise that pre-emption only 
operates with respect to the act in question and not the entire area. 
47 The principle of conferred powers implies that the Union may only exercise those powers 
that are conferred upon it by the Treaties.  In other words ‘la compétence nationale demeure 
le principe et la compétence communautaire l’exception’ (D. Simon Le système juridique 
communautaire (3rd edn, PUF 2001)). An analogous rule can be found in various federal 
systems, eg in the US ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people’ 
(US Constitution, Amendment X).
48 Thus, in the field of asylum, seven specific measures are to be adopted including me-
asures concerning the creation of a uniform status for refugees and those enjoying subsi-
diary protection, and the procedures to grant and withdraw such a status, reception condi-
tions, burden sharing arrangements between Member States and arrangements with third 
countries (article 78 (2) TFEU). Similar lists of measures to be taken within the context of a 
policy developed by the Union can be found for immigration policy (article 79(2) TFEU) and 
judicial cooperation (article 81(2)). See also D Chalmers and A Tomkins, European Public 
Law (CUP 2007) 211. Similarly, in the area of criminal law, while the Treaty appears to de-
fine a general area within which Union action can be taken, subsequent provisions create 
very specific limits. Thus, the Union may develop legislation with a view to defining certain 
criminal offences and sanctions, notably those that are ‘particularly serious’ and with a 
‘cross-border dimension’ (ie an open category, defined by objective criteria). However, the 
same paragraph limits this power to nine specific areas of crime (ie a closed list of specific 
crimes).
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A second feature of the system of competences in the AFSJ is the 
lack of provisions granting flexibility that are common in other areas of 
EU policy, in particular the internal market. There is no equivalent of 
article 114 TFEU granting general powers to the Union to take measures 
‘which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the in-
ternal market’. Where such provisions do exist, they tend to be specific to 
a particular area and operate by way of unanimity.49
As a corollary of this limitation on the powers of the Union, certain 
actions are specifically reserved to the authorities of the Member States. 
If the Union is to act in these areas, the coordinating nature of its role is 
emphasised.50 An example of this is found in the area of national secu-
rity.51 Where coordinating actions are envisaged, it is quite clear that the 
main agents in achieving this coordination are the Member States.52 
ii. Decision making in the AFSJ
The decision-making process of the AFSJ has, since the changes in-
troduced as part of the Lisbon Treaty, been more closely aligned with the 
rest of the Union. Significant advances have been made to create a more 
fully developed supranational structure for the development of law in the 
area, including a shift to the ordinary legislative procedure in a majority 
of areas and an increased role of the Commission. However, the AFSJ 
still displays a number of residual characteristics that limit centralising 
tendencies and, to a certain extent, emphasise the continued importance 
of the Member States in the decision-making process.
Firstly, in certain areas of the AFSJ, the Commission’s power of le-
gislative initiative is shared with the Member States.53 In these areas, the 
Commission is less able to shape the particular agenda and to influence 
legislative outcomes.54 Secondly, the continued existence of some (ad-
49 For example, article 83(1) contains a provision allowing for the list of crimes that may be 
subject to approximation to be modified by unanimity.
50 See Monar (n 24).
51 Eg article 72 TFEU which states ‘[t]his Title shall not affect the exercise of the respon-
sibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order 
and the safeguarding of internal security’. And article 73 TFEU ‘It shall be open to Member 
States to organise between themselves and under their responsibility such forms of coope-
ration and coordination as they deem appropriate between the competent departments of 
their administrations responsible for safeguarding national security’. 
52 See articles 72-74 TFEU. 
53 Under article 69 TFEU legislative initiatives can be introduced by a quarter of the Mem-
ber States in the areas of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. 
54 Speaking of arrangements in Title IV of the TEC following the Treaty of Amsterdam, Mo-
nar states: ‘It may be asked whether a transfer of policy areas to the Community framework 
which departs, even temporarily, from the principle of the Commission’s exclusive right of 
initiative still merits the term “communitarisation”’ (Monar (n 23) 329).
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mittedly limited) vetoes,55 quasi-vetoes and the ‘emergency brake proce-
dure’56 represents an aspect of the AFSJ where individual Member States 
exercise greater influence over the decision-making process.57 While less 
dramatic than the deployment of a veto and probably entailing significant 
political costs,58 the effect on the negotiating dynamics in the Council 
remains, ensuring that the ‘fundamentals’ of the various criminal justice 
systems are not affected. A final aspect of the institutional arrangements 
in the AFSJ that reflect a more cautious approach towards centralised 
law making is the stress laid on the principle of subsidiarity59 and the 
corresponding role of national parliaments. 
iii. Binding effect of norms
Perhaps one of the most significant changes introduced in the Tre-
aty of Lisbon was the replacement of the old third pillar measures, such 
as the convention, the common position and the framework decision. As 
noted above, these measures were originally rather inter-governmental 
in nature. Even when modified after the Treaty of Amsterdam,60 third 
55 Principally in family law, in ‘paraselle’ provisions extending the range of measures that 
can be taken by the Union, in the areas of police cooperation and in the establishment of a 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office. Provision is made for fast tracked enhanced coopera-
tion in the event that consensus is unachievable. 
56  For an analysis, see S Peers EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (3rd edn, OUP 2011) 65. 
57 The draft directive is then referred to the European Council while the procedure is sus-
pended. If the European Council is unable to reach a consensus on the matter, then the 
directive remains suspended with the possibility of nine Member States going ahead under 
the enhanced cooperation facility. The legal service of the Commission is of the opinion that 
the use of the wording ‘considers’ makes it less likely that this provision will be justiciable 
in a meaningful way before the Court of Justice. In a submission to the House of Lords, a 
member of the Legal Service was of the opinion that ‘it is hardly controllable by the Court 
because the sentence starts with “Where a member of the Council considers that” it affects 
…’ See European Union Committee, The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment (10th 
Report HL 2007-08, 62-II) 80.
58 See European Union Committee (n 57).
59 In the AFSJ, the scrutiny of the national parliaments is likely to be that bit more inten-
se with a special mention of the role of national parliaments in the area and the existence 
of a slightly modified ‘yellow card’ system. See article 69 TFEU and Protocol No 2 on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (article 7(2)). The successful 
issuing of a ‘yellow card’ by the national parliaments on concerns related to proportionality 
or subsidiarity obliges the proposing institution to withdraw, amend or maintain an act 
and it must give reasons for its decision. However, it should be noted that the impact of the 
principle of subsidiarity in criminal law in the EU has been judged by some to be limited. 
See E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Subsidiarity in the Area of EU Justice and Home Affairs Law—A Lost 
Cause?’ (2009) 15(3) European Law Journal 351. 
60 In the original TEU, ‘conventions’, ‘joint positions’, joint actions’ and ‘common positions’ 
were to be adopted under the third pillar. Subsequent to the reforms at Amsterdam, asylum 
and immigration and civil cooperation were moved to the first pillar and made subject (with 
some important modifications) to the ‘Community method’, thus allowing for directives to 
be adopted in these fields while the ‘framework decision’ was introduced in the third pillar 
(see article 34 TEU (old)) and became increasingly popular. For an overview of the instru-
ments in the third pillar following the Treaty of Amsterdam, see Monar (n 23) 326-327.
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pillar measures were limited in their binding effect and in particular lac-
ked direct effect.61 Their replacement with the more familiar ‘Community’ 
instruments of regulations and directives strengthens considerably the 
system of integration in the AFSJ, applying as it does the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect that distinguish Union law from traditional 
international law.62
iv. Enforcement
Not only is the binding effect of laws adopted in the AFSJ now en-
hanced, the mechanisms for their enforcement have been considerably 
strengthened. One of the features of the AFSJ prior to the Treaty of Li-
sbon was the weakness of the enforcement mechanisms. The preliminary 
reference procedure, long a central plank in the system of judicial con-
trol and in ensuring the uniform application of law in the context of the 
Community, was severely curtailed both in the third pillar63 and within 
the ‘communitarised’ Title IV TEC.64 The problem of a limited preliminary 
reference procedure was exacerbated by the lack of an infringement pro-
cedure in the third pillar. The combination of these two aspects signifi-
cantly limited the role of the Court of Justice in the AFSJ generally and in 
the third pillar in particular. However, it should be noted that this did not 
entirely prevent the Court from influencing the development of the law 
in the AFSJ.65 Given the historic role of the Court of Justice as an engine 
of integration,66 the limited judicial role constituted a major weakness of 
the system of integration in the AFSJ. The Treaty of Lisbon remedies this 
defect, bringing the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the powers of 
the Commission to launch infringement proceedings in the AFSJ into line 
with the rest of the Treaty.
61 In particular, the framework decision, in deliberate contrast to the directive, was specifi-
cally precluded from having direct effect. This did not, however, prevent the Court of Justice 
from ruling that such measures do enjoy indirect effect, in particular they carry a duty of 
conform interpretation (Case C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] 
ECR I-5285 concerning the application and interpretation of Framework decision 2001/220 
on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings).
62 Nonetheless, it should be noted that the existence of a transitional regime will prologue 
the complexity for a number of years to come. For an overview, see Peers (n 55) 61. For a 
general overview of the differences between EU law and EC law prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, 
see A Hinarejos, ‘The Lisbon Treaty Versus Standing Still: A View from the Third Pillar’ 
(2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 99. 
63 Ex article 35 TEU.
64 Ex article 68 TEC. 
65 For an overview of the Court of Justice’s role in the AFSJ prior to the Lisbon Treaty, see 
K Lenaerts, ‘The Contribution of the Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 255.
66 The role of the Court of Justice in the integration process has long been a subject of 
debate and controversy amongst political scientists. For an overview of the literature in the 
area, see L Conant, ‘The Politics of Legal Integration’ (2007) 45 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 45. 
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v. Territorial scope
The AFSJ is one of the clearest examples of ‘multi-speed Europe’. 
Given the fitful development of the AFSJ and the historically sensitive 
nature of the subject matter, some Member States were unwilling to cede 
national sovereignty over matters of asylum, immigration and national 
security, and so a system of vetoes prevailed. As vetoes have been abo-
lished in the communitarised parts of the AFSJ in the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, mechanisms were introduced to safeguard national sovereignty 
in the AFSJ. Firstly, systems of opt-out/opt-ins for AFSJ matters were 
created under the Treaty of Amsterdam and extended in the Treaty of Li-
sbon.67 Secondly, the introduction of the emergency brake procedure will 
also make enhanced cooperation easier to activate in certain areas of the 
AFSJ, removing as it does the need for a separate authorisation decision 
by the Council if the emergency brake is successfully applied.68 Moreover, 
given the sensitive nature of some of the subject matter in the AFSJ, it 
is likely to be a prime candidate for the future deployment of the mecha-
nism generally. Indeed, examples of enhanced cooperation have taken 
place recently in the AFSJ, notably a regulation on the law applicable to 
divorce and legal separation.69 
vi. Techniques of integration
While, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the same le-
gal instruments exist in the AFSJ as exist in other areas of EU law, it 
is worth highlighting a number of specific features of their use in the 
AFSJ that point to a particularly decentralised form of integration and 
which correspondingly leave a significant role for national legal systems 
as sources for the development of rules. 
The first point to be made concerns the type of instrument that is 
most commonly employed in the AFSJ. In virtually all areas of the AFSJ, 
67 The United Kingdom and Ireland enjoy a general opt-out of all Part II, Title V matters 
under the Treaty of Lisbon and a specific protocol on the application of the Schengen acqu-
is. See Protocol (No 21) On the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland with respect to 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and Protocol (No 19) On the Schengen Acquis 
Integrated into the Framework of the European Union. See also E Fahey, ‘Swimming in a 
Sea of Law: Reflections on Water Borders, Irish (-British)-Euro Relations and Opting-out 
and Opting-in after the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2010) 47(3) CML Rev 645. Denmark also enjoys 
various opt-outs, including opt-outs relating to the AFSJ and a special position regarding 
the Schengen acquis. See Protocol (No 22) On the Position of Denmark that includes provi-
sions on the Schengen acquis and the AFSJ more generally. A referendum may take place 
in the near future in Denmark on the issue of relinquishing the opt-outs.
68 See in particular articles 82(2) and 83 TFEU in relation to cooperation in civil and crimi-
nal matters.
69 Council Regulation (EU) 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced coo-
peration in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation [2010] OJ L343/2. 
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the directive (or its old third pillar counterpart, the framework decision) 
is the instrument of choice. The Treaty prescribes the use of directives for 
most substantive legal issues.70 Where regulations are employed, they are 
to deal with operational or technical matters such as the establishment 
and operation of agencies71 and information systems.72 The directive, in-
structing the Member States as to the goals to be achieved but leaving its 
implementation to national law, is particularly suited to a coordinating 
rather than consolidating role.73 In principle, it provides an overarching 
framework allowing Member States to tailor implementation to the parti-
cular circumstances of their legal systems, and facilitates decentralised 
integration. 
A second feature of legislative action in the AFSJ is the minimal 
approach taken towards ‘harmonisation’, establishing a floor for Member 
State action and leaving them free to apply stricter criteria. The creation 
of ‘minimum’ standards is evident from the titles of many directives74 and 
most of these provisions allow Member States to introduce ‘more favou-
rable’ provisions.75 Whereas prior to the Treaty of Lisbon the Union was 
expressly limited to enacting minimum measures in certain fields such 
as asylum and immigration, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Li-
sbon this limitation has been removed. Nonetheless, in practice the Com-
mission would appear to be retaining its pre-Lisbon practice of merely 
proposing measures of minimum harmonisation in the field, suggesting 
that legislative practice in the area will continue to favour a decentralised 
70 Thus, in the area of immigration law, provisions on the status of long term residents 
(Directive 2003/109/EC), family reunification (Directive 2003/86/EC), immigration for re-
searchers, students and highly skilled workers (Directive 2005/71/EC) are all regulated by 
Directives. 
71 Council Decision of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the 
fight against serious crime (2002/187/JHA).
72 Regulation 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ 
for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention.
73 As mentioned by Labayle ‘mis à part le cas particulier de la politique des visas qui fait 
usage de l’outil réglementaire, l’action de la communauté en matière migratoire repose sur 
la technique de la legislation indirecte impliquée par la volonté de rapprocher, d’harmoniser 
et de coordonner les legislations nationales’ (H Labayle, ‘Vers une politique commune de 
l’asile et d’immigration dans l’union européene’ in F Julien-Lafarrière, H Labayle & O Ed-
stöm (eds), Politique Européene d’immigration et d’asile: Bilan critique 5 ans après le traité 
d’Amsterdam (Bruylant 2005) 36).
74 Ex Directive 2004/83/EC is entitled ‘minimum standards for the qualification and sta-
tus of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of the protection granted’. However, it sho-
uld be noted that with the change introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, the Union is no longer 
limited to the creation of ‘minimal standards’ in the areas of immigration and asylum. It 
remains to be seen if this will have an impact on legislative developments in these areas.
75 Article 3(5) of Family Reunification, Directive 2004/8/EC, allows Member States to in-
troduce ‘more favourable’ provisions. For a discussion of the implications of this ‘margin 
of appreciation’ and in particular when assessing the directive’s conformity with human 
rights, see Case C-540/03 European Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-05769.
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regime.76 In addition, much of the legislation in the AFSJ includes optio-
nal provisions that Member States ‘may’ apply, while some directives are 
replete with derogations77 with the effect of varying the impact of a direc-
tive depending on the choices made in its implementation. 
Much of the ‘harmonising’ legislation in the AFSJ includes referen-
ces or ‘renvois’ to national law, thereby incorporating national law terms 
and definitions into the Union measure. Thus, EU law may provide that 
national law is to determine certain aspects of the applicable legal regime 
such as the penalties to be imposed under the framework decision on 
combating terrorism.78 The applicable law is therefore constructed from a 
combination of Union law and national law. 
It can be seen that through minimum harmonisation and the use 
of options, derogations and renvois, much of the normative content in 
the AFSJ arises from national law, thereby preserving to a certain extent 
national law-making autonomy and facilitating varying national prefe-
rences. Nonetheless, EU law does exert a degree of coherence and homo-
geneity within the AFSJ, in particular since the changes introduced in 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The AFSJ now enjoys a fully fledged supranational 
legal system complete with a doctrine of supremacy, direct effect and a 
supranational judicial system. Furthermore, recent developments in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice suggest that certain general princi-
ples of law and interpretation may act as a limiting force on the differen-
tiated tendencies in the AFSJ. 
Through its jurisprudence, the Court of Justice appears to place 
limits on the decentralising tendencies of such legislation.79 Thus, the 
76 For the Commission’s proposals on the next generation of asylum measures, see Com-
mission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on mini-
mum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or  stateless per-
sons as beneficiaries of international protection and the content of the protection granted 
COM(2009) 551 final; Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing international protection COM(2009) 554 final; and Commission, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum standards 
for the reception of asylum seekers COM (2008) 815 final. 
77 de Bruycker cites the example of one commentator counting fifty possible derogations in 
the procedures directive (P de Bruycker, ‘Le Niveau d’harmonisation legislative de la poli-
tique Européene d’immigration et d’asile’ in Julien-Lafarrière, Labayle & Edstöm (n 73) 54).
78 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism 
[2002] OJ L164/3, art 5(2). Similarly, under Regulation No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdic-
tion and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters 
of parental responsibility, the determination of whether custody rights exist or not is to be 
made by reference to national law as has been recently decided by the Court of Justice in 
Case C-400/10 PPU J McB v L E [nyr] paras 43-44. 
79 Although fundamental rights may sometimes have the opposite effect on the operation 
of a coherent European legal system, posing a threat to uniform solutions. See the recent 
Opinion of AG. 
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fact that it is national law that complements or derogates from rules laid 
down in the directive does not remove the matter from the jurisdiction 
of the Court.80 A directive leaving a certain margin of appreciation for 
Member States cannot implicitly or explicitly authorise measures that 
would breach European standards of fundamental rights.81 Similarly, in 
the context of references to national law, it would appear that such a 
reference would only be valid if the national law itself was compatible 
with fundamental rights.82 Equally, ‘more favourable provisions’ can ge-
nerally be implemented only ‘in so far as they are compatible with the 
Directive’.83 The result is that implementing measures cannot compromi-
se the purposes of the Directive.84 
Particular mention should be reserved for the use of ‘mutual reco-
gnition’ in the AFSJ. As with the ‘flexible harmonisation’ approach, this 
is not a new technique nor is it particular to the AFSJ.85 However, its 
use in the AFSJ, in particular in the areas of judicial cooperation, has 
been enthusiastically embraced and now forms the central plank in the 
Union’s efforts at integration in the AFSJ. In practice, it has long been 
considered the ‘cornerstone’ of integration efforts in the AFSJ.86 However, 
the Treaty of Lisbon enshrines its importance in the Treaty and would 
appear to privilege its use,87 while the Commission in its action plan im-
plementing the Stockholm programme notes that the ‘focus will remain 
primarily on mutual recognition and the harmonisation of offences and 
sanctions will be pursued for selected cases’.88 
Mutual recognition is differentiated integration par excellence, 
allowing integration while maintaining legal diversity. It creates a form 
of interpenetration between legal systems, extending the scope of one 
legal system beyond its own geographical frontiers and into the territory 
80 European Parliament v Council (n 75) para 22.
81 ibid para 23.
82 See J McB v L E (n 78) para 49. 
83 Ex Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L304/12. 
84 Cases C- 57/09 and C-101/09 Germany v B&D [nyr] para 115.  
85 There are, however a number of key differences that should be taken into account betwe-
en the use of the concept in the internal market and in the AFSJ. See M Möstl, ‘Preconditi-
ons and Limits of Mutual Recognition’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 405, 408-409.
86 European Council, Tampere Council Conclusions 15-16 October 1999 point 4 <http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm> accessed 3 April 2011.
87 On procedural matters, approximation of laws are only to take place in so far as is nece-
ssary to facilitate mutual recognition. See article 82(2) TFEU. 
88 See Commission Action Plan (n 28) (emphasis added).
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of another.89 And whereas in the internal market this amounted to eco-
nomic regulatory interpenetration, in the AFSJ it is connected to the ad-
ministration of justice. The mutual recognition of judgments is perhaps 
the most visible and widely commented on form of mutual recognition in 
the AFSJ.90 
It should also be noted that the existence of a lack of trust betwe-
en national legal systems has attracted significant controversy and 
comment.91 It is in this area that mutual recognition and approximation 
of laws are complementary in nature. The existence of approximation 
is intended to generate sufficient trust between legal systems to allow 
mutual recognition to take place between legal orders. ‘[A] means/ends 
relationship exists between approximation and mutual recognition. The 
former is conceived as a tool to promote the development of the latter’.92 
The creation of such ‘mutual trust’ by approximation measures in the 
area of criminal procedure would now appear to be a priority of the Union 
post-Treaty of Lisbon, and a roadmap for the development of defendants’ 
rights has been incorporated into the Stockholm Programme.93 Thus, me-
asures such as the recent Directive on the right to interpretation and 
translation in criminal proceedings are justified by the need to increase 
levels of trust between Member States’ legal systems.94
Tension therefore exists at the heart of the system of integration 
in the AFSJ between the creation of a single system while at the same 
time facilitating variation. On the one hand, it can be seen that certain 
aspects of integration in the AFSJ aim at establishing a coherent system. 
89  These differences notwithstanding the founding principle of mutual recognition in both 
internal market and criminal law is similar: the recognition of national standards by other 
EU Member States. In that sense, as Nicolaidis and Shaffer have noted, “recognition cre-
ates extraterritoriality”. National standards must be recognised “extraterritorially”, in the 
sense that they must be applied and/or enforced by another Member State’.  See V Mitsile-
gas, ‘The Constitutional Implications of Mutual Recognition in Criminal Matters in the EU’ 
(2006) 43 CML Rev 1277, 1281. In the article by Nicolaidis and Shaffer quoted by Mitesile-
gas, the authors describe mutual recognition as ‘extraterritoriality applied in a consensual 
or at least bi- or plurilateral, “other-regarding” manner’ (K Nicolaidis and G Shaffer, ‘Tran-
snational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government’ (2005) 68 
Law and Contemporary Problems 263, 267). 
90  Following the ‘flagship’ measure of the European Arrest Warrant, its use has been 
extended, with the European Evidence Warrant being perhaps the most important follow-
up (Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA on the European Evidence Warrant for the pur-
pose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters 
[2008] OJ L350/72). 
91 See Mitsilegas (n 89).
92 M Fichera, ‘The European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Conve-
nience?’ (2009) 15 ELJ 70, 77. 
93 See Stockholm Programme (n 3) 5.
94 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 
2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings [2010] OJ 
L280/1. 
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In particular, the institutional arrangements, the exclusionary nature of 
competences, the binding nature of norms and mechanisms of enfor-
cement post-Lisbon are classically supranational in character. On the 
other hand, elements such as the specificity of competences and the tools 
and techniques employed in fostering integration in the area represent a 
particularly strong form of differentiated integration. In this respect, the 
system established within the AFSJ appears aimed at organising variati-
on. This tension between coherence and differentiation is reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice that appears to be attempting to 
strike a balance between the autonomy reserved for Member States and 
adherence to common general principles. 
Conclusion
In analysing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as part of 
the broader story of European legal integration, the purpose of this paper 
has been twofold. The first purpose has been to gain an understanding 
of what the AFSJ entails as a new area of integration and what it impli-
es for the construction of the European Union. The second purpose has 
been to assess the system of integration that currently exists in the AFSJ. 
In both respects it can be seen that, in the light of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
the AFSJ reflects broader trends in European integration, namely the 
increasing scope of European law combined with a more flexible model of 
integration. Integration in the AFSJ can therefore be seen to be a system 
for organising difference. 
The AFSJ has gradually developed into a significant new domain of 
action for the Union that appears to be in the process of constructing a 
‘public order’ at the level of the European Union founded on fundamental 
rights, citizenship and a community of values. This process, in particular 
the incorporation of citizenship and fundamental values, has been confir-
med in both the Treaty of Lisbon and in the Stockholm Programme. In a 
related move, the Treaty of Lisbon has completed the process of creating 
a fully-fledged supranational system of integration complete with binding 
norms, a supranational decision-making structure and a key role for the 
Court of Justice. At the same time, the AFSJ reflects increased flexibility 
and differentiation in integration. The limited nature of its competences, 
the increased capacity for a ‘multi-speed’ Europe and above all the vari-
ety of tools and techniques aim, not to construct a complete pan-Europe-
an legal regime, but rather to increase cooperation and inter-operability 
between national legal systems and thereby manage variation within a 
single coherent system. 
